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Intellectual Property Protection in
Collaborative Design through
Lean Information Modeling and
Sharing
Establishing efficient, effective, and trustworthy engineering collaboration while protect-
ing intellectual property is vital to maintain organizational competence in today’s global
business environment. In this paper, a lean information modeling and sharing framework
is described to support engineering data security management in a peer-to-peer collabo-
rative environment. It allows for selective and interoperable data sharing with fine-
grained access control at both the server and client sides, thus securing different levels of
design information dissemination for intellectual property protection purposes. The con-
siderations of time and value-adding activity with roles, policy delegation relation in a
distributed context, and fine-grained control at data set level in the model are to adhere
to the general least privilege principle in access control. Heterogeneous design data are
exchanged selectively through an eXtensible Markup Language common interface, which
provides a neutral format to enhance data interoperability and prevents reverse
engineering. DOI: 10.1115/1.2190235
Keywords: internet-aided design and manufacturing, intellectual property protection, ac-
cess control, digital rights management, data security, XML encryption, interoperability
1 Introduction
Global markets call for collaborative product development
among designers, manufacturers, suppliers, vendors, and other
stakeholders. The business pressures toward outsourcing allow
most of the design work for complex products to be done across
firms. For example, Ford estimates that its supply chain involves
more than 800 suppliers, and Ford is substantively relying on
these suppliers to participate in vehicle design 1. The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA estimates that the
supply chain accounts for more than 50% of weapon system and
major subsystem production costs 2.
Product design includes the whole spectrum of conceptualiza-
tion, detailed design, analysis, simulation, and prototyping. Col-
laborative design is the process where multidisciplinary stake-
holders participate in design decision-making and share product
information across enterprise boundaries in an Internet-enabled
distributed environment. Intellectual property IP protection thus
is critical to a company when sharing data with its suppliers or
customers. During collaboration, a manufacturer may share cer-
tain data with its supplier as design specifications. It may also
share data with its customer for analysis and simulation purposes.
One of the most important items to protect in product develop-
ment is design data such as certain parameter values, user defined
features in feature models, special contours in surface models,
inventive configuration in composite materials, and innovative as-
sembly mechanisms, which may have IP value to protect. Particu-
lar attention to IP management is necessary in digital environ-
ments, in which perfect copies can easily be made at little cost.
Establishing trustworthy engineering collaboration to protect IP is
vital to maintain organizational competence.
Trust, confidentiality, and integrity issues involved in sharing
data are immense. Two important security services needed for
product data are confidentiality of product design data in storage
or in transit and access control read, write, delete privileges.
There are new issues about design information modeling and
communication in collaborative design. Current CAD data for-
mats were designed for standalone systems. All information about
components and assemblies has to be available locally in order to
be processed. Transferring complete design information among
design collaborators requires a large amount of data to be moved
around. Some cryptographic communication protocols e.g., SSL
provide good end-to-end security by securing the communication
channel at the packet level and providing in-transit document con-
fidentiality. However, data security should be ensured at either end
of the communication link, especially at the client side.
Unlike conventional centralized access control models for files
and resources, we present a fine-grained role-based access control
for different data segments within one file in a distributed design
environment in this paper. This model combines role-based and
cryptographic access control to form a new mechanism for flex-
ible data security management and selective information dissemi-
nation through interoperable data model in a collaborative envi-
ronment. Heterogeneous data are shared through an eXtensible
Markup Language XML common interface, which provides
vendor-neutral solutions to enhance data interoperability.
There are many research issues related to collaborative design,
for example, system architecture and infrastructure, data and sys-
tem interoperability, conflict detection and resolution, version and
concurrency control for collaborative modeling. However, in this
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paper, we only focus on the protection issue in data sharing. In the
rest of the paper, Sec. 2 describes the related work in data security,
digital rights management, and intellectual property protection.
Section 3 discusses the general requirements for protected data
sharing and access control in collaborative design environments.
Section 4 presents a lean information modeling and sharing
mechanism for IP protection in collaborative design, where prod-
uct information is shared selectively and interoperably with fine-
grained access control. Section 5 shows the application of the
mechanism in different data sharing scenarios and Sec. 6 dis-
cusses the advantage as well as tradeoffs of this approach.
2 Background
2.1 Digital Rights Management. Digital rights management
DRM was created as a means of managing digital data contain-
ing intellectual property and it refers to the technologies and
mechanisms specifically developed to manage digital rights. DRM
includes several technology domains including security and trust,
payment systems, and e-commerce system. In the entertainment
industry, IP protection methodologies are driven by the needs of
digital multimedia market. Some companies that provide propri-
etary digital rights management system DRMS technology in-
clude Adobe DRM 3, IBM EMMS 4, LockStream 5, and
Microsoft RMS 6. DRMS often includes centralized control that
will monitor, regulate, and price each subsequent use of a com-
puter file that contains media content, such as video, audio, pho-
tos, or text.
In DRMS, core protection technologies include encryption,
passwords, watermarking, digital signature, digital fingerprint,
copy detection systems, and payment systems 7. Broadcast en-
cryption 8 allows an encrypted message to be broadcasted so
that only a dynamically changing designated group of users can
decrypt it. It also enables efficient rights revocation. Watermark-
ing 9 could offer copyright protection, ownership assertion, and
integrity checks for digital content. Key issues include security,
robustness, and ownership dispute. Digital contract 10 can be
used in DRM for legal agreement before distribution and other
related business transactions. More recently, researchers have
called for DRM standards and standardization of a rights manage-
ment language 11.
2.2 Watermarking and Fingerprinting. Digital watermark-
ing is a commonly used technology in the battle against piracy. It
consists in embedding in an object marks that can be used for
evidencing IP ownership, channel tracing, authentication, or label-
ing. Watermarks are commonly used in image, audio, and video,
particularly in the entertainment industry. Traditional studies on
watermarking concentrate on digital multimedia content data
types 12,13. In 3D geometry data, most of the existing research
focuses on data embedding in polygonal mesh models through
geometry perturbation or topology change 14–16, coefficient
perturbation in frequency domain 17–19, and appearance at-
tribute change 20,21. Similar to image and video watermarking,
these methods concentrate on the appearance of 3D models and
cannot be directly applied in CAD models, where modification is
not tolerable. On the other hand, Ohbuchi et al. 22 developed a
data embedding method for non-uniform rational B-spline
NURBS curves and surfaces using reparametrization without
changing their original geometric shape.
Fingerprinting is an alternative to watermarking that does not
modify objects. It captures a design’s distinctive characteristics
and registers them with a trusted arbiter, who can later judge IP
infringements. An effective fingerprinting technique must achieve
minimal overhead, require low effort, and be secure against multi-
party collusion. In electronic design, as current CAD tool and
large-scale integration capabilities such as field-programmable
gate arrays FPGA create a new market of reusable digital de-
signs, the fingerprinting process 23,24 can produce secure marks
and unique physical layouts for each design instance recipient. In
shape design, Ko et al. 25 developed matching methods between
two NURBS surfaces based on integral properties and Gaussian
and mean curvatures.
2.3 Access Control. Access control is one of the most effec-
tive mechanisms used to enhance data security and IP protection.
Major access control methods include: 1 discretionary access
control DAC 26, where access is based solely on the identity
of the person trying to access the data resource; 2 mandatory
access control MAC 27, where mechanisms assign security
levels to data resources and security clearances to users, and users
have access only to data for which they have clearance; and 3
role-based access control RBAC 28, where permissions are
granted based on roles. A role is a job function with associated
authority and responsibility that are specified within the context of
an organization.
No single access control mechanism can provide the greatest
overall benefit to all users in all circumstances. Tradeoffs have to
be made regarding performance, compatibility, and ease of use for
the quality of protection in a particular situation. RBAC models
are prescribed as a generalized approach for access control and
policy neutral 29. Role hierarchies and constraints enable a wide
range of security policies to be expressed. Some extensions of the
RBAC model also exist 30,31.
In addition, cryptography is valuable in access control of data
independent of system implementations. Cryptographic access
control CAC is the mechanism to control data access by key
distribution, which is flexible to operate across multiple adminis-
trative domains and heterogeneous security policies. Harrington
and Jensen 32 proposed a CAC model to ensure secrecy and
authenticity of distributed file systems based on asymmetric cryp-
tography and to ensure integrity and availability by using a log-
structured file system.
The role-based data access control is a central issue for data
security management in distributed product development environ-
ments. Cera et al. 33,34 applied the mechanisms of RBAC to
information protection in design collaboration. A central role-
based view control system is developed to manage collaborators’
viewing and modeling privileges. Multi-resolution geometry is
generated by the methods of mesh simplification and progressive
mesh. We extended RBAC to a Scheduled Role-Based Distributed
Data Access Control S-RBDDAC model 35,36 in order to sup-
port data security management in a distributed design environ-
ment. It allows for fine-grained data access control at both the
server and client sides, securing different levels of design infor-
mation in collaborative design.
3 Access Control Requirements for Data Sharing in
Collaborative DESIGN
Access control is an essential part of any collaborative environ-
ment to protect data from unauthorized users. It is important to
determine what the data access control requirements are and relate
these requirements to the information infrastructure of a collabo-
rative product development environment. Users or entities in the
collaborative process must be identified by properly established
access control mechanisms before access is granted or authoriza-
tion is issued. The primary objective of access control in collabo-
rative environments is the preservation and protection of confi-
dential information, the integrity of data, and continued
availability of information, systems, and resources. Authentication
validates a subject’s identity, while authorization determines what
resources the subject is allowed to access. Authorization also as-
signs privileges such as the abilities to read, write, or modify.
In addition to the above basic requirements for access control,
collaborative environments possess special characteristics:
1 The dynamic nature of users and groups: The activity-level
security infrastructure for data exchange should be separated from
the organization-level security infrastructure, since participants of
inter-organizational data exchange and workflow may change dy-
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namically during the life cycle of an activity due to workflow
scheduling and balancing, system and software upgrading, and
corporation split, merge, and reconfiguration. Stakeholders may
change during the life-cycle of a project as functional, technical,
and financial needs change. New outsourcing may be needed as a
project proceeds. Therefore, a flexible access control model is
needed to enable distributed design data access and sharing in this
environment. When an information supply chain relation is estab-
lished or terminated, the access control system should easily ac-
commodate the frequent changes.
2 Peer-to-peer collaboration: Traditional access control deci-
sions are made based on subjects-permission-object relations at
the level of data files in a centralized produce lifecycle manage-
ment PLM system. The conventional mechanism is too coarse in
the situation of inter-organizational data exchange and informa-
tion flow management, which tends to be multi-level and context-
dependent. An original equipment manufacturer OEM normally
has multi-tier suppliers, and a supplier participates in different
design projects for multiple OEMs. Storing all design data in
OEM’s central PLM system is hardly acceptable to suppliers. In-
stead of static client-server relations, peer-to-peer relations exist in
a design collaboration environment, where stakeholders share in-
formation mutually within an enterprise as well as enterprise-to-
enterprise, as shown in Fig. 1. In this peer-to-peer environment,
information flow is bidirectional and dynamic. Decentralized and
scalable access control mechanisms that support many-to-many
relations with multiple granularity requirements are necessary.
This enhances data security of existing business-to-business vir-
tual design environment such as FIPER 37,38.
3 Long-term and short-term trust relationship: To maintain
and manage trusted business relations in enterprise-to-enterprise
collaboration, reliable access control mechanisms for data that
reside at client side should be established. Only necessary infor-
mation is transmitted and exposed to receivers. Different views of
data and data flow based on users’ need-to-know criteria and their
affiliated organization should be provided. It is important to have
access controls on the data that have been sent to collaborators
during the process of specification exchange. The amount of in-
formation to expose to the collaborators will depend on the trust
levels between collaboration participants. Within one data flow
relation, there could be different projects involved, and segments
of data within one single data file need to be differentiated and
managed.
4 Large-volume data with heterogeneous formats in long and
repetitive transactions: Different from single-cycle e-business
transactions, data transactions in design collaboration usually have
multiple cycles involved such as in design change, collision de-
tection, and simulation. This requires a large amount of informa-
tion such as geometry and mesh data to be sent over networks
repetitively. Design data may be in different formats e.g., text
description, formula, 2D or 3D CAD data, and image. Efficient
and interoperable data modeling is needed to share heterogeneous
design data during design collaboration.
New access control in dynamic collaborative design environ-
ments should go beyond just labeling subjects and objects. An
access control model should be based on less volatile relations.
Another level of abstraction such as roles, which enables indirect
references, can provide more stable controls. It should also allow
fine-grained information dissemination at different levels of data
set e.g., assembly, component, feature, surface, and curve and
different views of data based on how organizations and individu-
als behave in a task and to support the least privilege security
principle, as well as the communication bandwidth limit and the
frequency of data transfers and updates. Furthermore, data set
level access control should consider the heterogeneity of data for-
mats. A general model should not make too many assumptions
about data formats and storage media. Data could be stored as
documents or in databases. Thus, associated data models for in-
formation exchange need to provide an interoperable solution for
different data types and formats.
In this paper, a secure data modeling and sharing framework for
intellectual property protection is presented, which is based on the
S-RBDDAC model and generic XML data format for fine-grained
information sharing. Utilizing a role-oriented data access proce-
dure within a dynamic collaboration environment reduces the
complexity of security administration. To improve the flexibility
further, another dimension of time/schedule is introduced such
that permissions are based on what function a user performs in a
particular project within a specified time period. Functional roles
such as designers, manufacturers, and sales personnel within an
enterprise, as well as suppliers, government agencies, retailers,
and customers outside of the enterprise become the intermediate
layer between users and permissions.
4 Distributed Design Data Access Control
4.1 S-RBDDAC Model. S-RBDDAC is an access control
model for collaborative design data, not considering operating
system level operations and processes. It intends to separate data
level controls from operating system or network level controls.
This model defines elements and their relations, as shown in Fig.
2 and listed in Table 1.
Within the model, the following relations are defined:
• URUR: a many-to-many mapping user-to-role assign-
ment relation.
• U S :U→2S, a mapping of a user to the sessions created by
the user.
• S R :S→2R, a mapping of a session to the involved roles.
• RPRP: a many-to-many mapping permission-to-role
assignment relation.
• OPOP: a many-to-many mapping object-to-permission
assignment relation.
• S SCH:S→SCH, a one-to-one mapping of a session to its
schedule.
Fig. 1 An example of peer-to-peer collaboration relations
among enterprises and within an enterprise
Fig. 2 S-RBDDAC model
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• R SCH:R→2SCH, a mapping of a role to its action sched-
ules.
• RRRR: a partially ordered role hierarchy.
• OOOO: a partially ordered object hierarchy.
• PLCPLCPLCPLC: a partially ordered policy
hierarchy.
The user-to-role assignment allows the same user to play dif-
ferent roles, and a single role to be assigned to a team of users.
The permission-to-role assignment allows a single permission to
be applicable for multiple roles. One role can have multiple tasks.
The object-to-permission assignment ensures that an object can be
accessed with different levels of granularity.
The role hierarchy is mathematically a partial order defining a
seniority relation between roles, whereby senior roles acquire the
permissions of their juniors, and junior roles acquire the user
membership of their seniors. The object hierarchy defines a subset
relation between objects, whereby accessing subset objects at least
needs permissions of accessing their supersets. The policy hierar-
chy is a policy delegation relation, in which a delegated policy
should be stricter than its parent policies. The hierarchical rela-
tions of roles, objects, and policies are illustrated in Fig. 3.
This model eliminates unnecessary access from both functional
and time considerations. It provides two-dimensional access con-
trols such that access is granted only when absolutely necessary
and collaboration is established only where needed.
User access of the data needs to be constrained by time. For
example, a manufacturer within a specified team is not allowed to
access relevant data until all priori time schedules have been met.
This scheduled access control procedure provides a lean approach
to data set d access. Table 2 provides definitions of some more
terms in the S-RBDDAC model.
In any given instance I of collaboration, only value-adding
collaboration  is needed during the process of a product devel-
opment project. Non-value-adding collaboration n, such as un-
necessary data browsing, redundant service request, and unsched-
uled service initiation, interferes with other collaboration. Figure 4
depicts the relationships and transitions between the states as well
as privileges. The project’s owner creates sessions and configures
users, roles, schedules, permissions, and objects within the ses-
sions. The schedule element contains a set of time intervals and
locations with associated collaboration status. According to the
schedule, roles and corresponding data access privileges are
classified as being in either the UP state UP: the access is per-
mitted or DOWN state DOWN: the access is not allowed as the
case may be for the corresponding session. A negative state is the
situation where a user’s access to a particular resource is denied
for the entire session.
A role access privilege is UP when the user’s collaborative
expertise is required for the current stage. Such collaboration may
be required at different stages of the collaborative effort within a
product design and development project session. The ordinary
stateless role-based model without schedule may cause access
clutter. The S-RBDDAC model reduces the granted positive privi-
Table 1 Elements of S-RBDDAC
Elements Definitions
Policy
PLC
Operating rules that can be referred to as a
means of maintaining order, control, and
consistency for ease of management.
User
U
A human being; however, the concept of a
user can be extended to machines,
networks, or intelligent autonomous
agents.
Session
S
An activity or work process.
Role
R
A job function with associated authority
and responsibility that are specified within
the context of an organization.
Object
O
Any data resource or data segment subject
to access control.
Permission
P
An approval to access to one or more
protected objects.
Schedule
SCH
A collection of access time intervals,
locations, and collaboration states.
Fig. 3 Hierarchical relations of roles, objects, and policies
Table 2 Privileges and states
Terms Definitions
Data set d A set of data containing fine-grained
information.
Instance I A snapshot of a session.
Value-adding
collaboration

Collaboration in which value is added
during the session.
non-value-
adding
collaboration
n
Collaboration in which value is not
added during the session.
UP State UP The state in which the user is allowed
access for expected value-adding
collaboration.
DOWN State
DOWN
The state in which the user is not
allowed access for expected non-value-
adding collaboration.
Negative State
NEG
The state in which the user is strictly
denied access during an entire session.
Positive
privilege
The positive privilege contains the UP
and DOWN states; this privilege exists
for all collaborators who have some
type of access to a particular resource.
Negative
privilege
The negative privilege contains the
Negative state; this privilege exists for
all collaborators who do not have any
type of access to a particular resource.
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leges to the lowest level. Depending on the requirements of the
project, accesses are scheduled as needed. Constraints can be
added to the S-RBDDAC model, which are separation of duty
SOD relations to enforce conflict of interest policies. These poli-
cies may be used to prevent users from exceeding a reasonable
level of authority. The constraints can be added to any relations
such as user-to-role assignments, role hierarchies, permission-to-
role assignments, policy delegation, and SOD relations. For ex-
ample, users from two competing suppliers cannot be assigned
roles that work in one common session; a junior role cannot in-
herit two senior roles that have mutually exclusive permissions; a
project owner may delegate its policy associated with the project
to subordinate collaborative partners in order to ensure compli-
ance, yet maintaining some level of security control of the project;
and a junior role inherits SOD constraints from its senior roles.
SOD relations can be dynamic, and do not persist as schedules
change. Figure 5 shows an example of access control policies for
two collaborating corporations, each of which creates its own
policy to protect its design data based on the defined roles, sched-
uled time intervals, as well as locations for each session.
4.2 Lean Information Sharing through XML. The struc-
tures and sizes of data involved in the whole product development
cycle could vary significantly. Different data types need to be
shared, including specification, CAD geometry, mesh model,
simulation code and result, image, as well as documents contain-
ing text, graphs, formulas, etc. This puts a formidable challenge
on data access control and management. Organizations find it dif-
ficult comparing and sharing data with other enterprise data
sources due to varying data formats as depicted in Fig. 6a. A
ubiquitous format standard will simplify the format transforma-
tion process. Figure 6b shows the integration of the different
design data sources into one common format. Therefore, to enable
access control for different product data in various formats, an
indirect approach has to be taken in a distributed data-sharing
environment. Instead of directly sending original data, a common
protocol such as an XML interface for different data formats may
be established in advance. XML provides a common syntax for
modeling data. It offers a user-defined and extensible format to
represent data and information for different application areas.
XML also allows for separation of content from format, enabling
the processing and presentation of information. As an emerging
data exchange standard, XML can handle complex data structures
such as vector graphics, e-commerce transactions, mathematical
equations and provides interoperability, system-independence,
ease of transformation and data parsing.
While proprietary data format is the major hurdle for engineer-
ing data exchange, open standards are needed to allow interoper-
able data sharing. However, the special syntax and schema defi-
nitions of current STEP/EXPRESS standards build high
development and implementation barrier in industry practice 39.
In contrast, XML is easily extensible and numerous software tools
are available with little cost. In order to take advantage of XML’s
flexibility and popularity in development community, ISO is
adopting XML into STEP standards as part 28 40.
XML is an open medium for information transferring and shar-
ing. Securing data in this format is critical to protect IP. Some
related XML security standards are being developed. For example,
the XML Access Control Markup Language XACML 41 com-
municates policy information regarding data set access control,
specifying what portions of the data can be exposed to appropriate
parties. XML Signature, XML Encryption, and XML Key Man-
agement 42 schemes address varying requirements for access
authority, confidentiality and data integrity.
Fig. 4 Transitions between states and privileges
Fig. 5 Two examples of access control policies
Fig. 6 Different data sources/formats interaction with a common data interface
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We developed a distributed design data scheme, Universal
Linkage-Product Markup Language UL-PML, to model geom-
etry, topology, features, and constraints in networked collaborative
design environments. Unlike current open standard STEP and
other industry standards for visualization e.g., JT-Open 43,
X3D 44 and data exchange e.g., PLM-XML 45, UL-PML is
a constraint-enabled distributed product data model in native
XML format. Multidisciplinary design information can be cap-
tured, distributed, and linked with different levels of granularity
and flexibility. UL-PML scheme captures geometric and non-
geometric relations among entities in a virtual link style so that
references between entities can be made across the boundary of
files and physical locations in a distributed design environment.
This scheme allows design information to be integrated in a col-
laborative design environment. Besides static relations among de-
sign objects, dynamic relations/constraints are also incorporated.
Detailed description of UL-PML and the comparison with other
representations are discussed in Ref. 46.
The network-aware data model intends to improve design in-
formation interoperability based on general data interoperability.
XML syntax guarantees the openness of the UL model. The stan-
dardization of PML schemas can additionally provide semantics-
level interoperability.
The UL model does not require that one data file contain all the
information relevant to the designed product. Incorporating physi-
cal distribution and logical integration, it makes partial design
information storage and retrieval easy to realize. This provides
another level of granularity and increases the flexibility during
design information query. Design information can be stored
modularly without compromising the integrity of the whole prod-
Fig. 7 Universal linkage between files with static „aggregation, generalization,
association… and dynamic „geometric and non-geometric constraint… relations
across file boundaries
Fig. 8 UL model representation and mapping
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uct. This reduces the requirement for computational time and stor-
age space. Hence, it increases flexibility for scalable designer sys-
tems, and encourages reuse of design at subassembly, component,
feature, or surface levels.
Lean information sharing and exchange for collaborative design
can be realized over the Internet. Relations of design data ele-
ments and constraints are represented in the UL model to create an
information framework. They are explicit linkages that ensure
product data’s consistency, thus a logically integrated set of design
information can be built in a distributed environment. The rela-
tions among entities are not restricted within one data file. As
illustrated in Fig. 7, relations of entities both static and dynamic
in different domains and physical locations can be created. One
can easily refer entities in other data files, either at the same
machine or other locations over the Internet. This allows partial
data to be transferred over networks without compromising logi-
cal integrity.
The integrated geometric and non-geometric constraint repre-
sentation in UL model incorporates more design knowledge into
design data. The explicit capturing of multidisciplinary con-
straints, especially non-geometric constraints, enables a more
complete information representation than current standard for-
mats. This provides a more comprehensive support for design in-
tent representation at different design stages. Graphically, the UL
model can be represented by Directed Hyper Graphs. Textually,
the UL model is stored as PML. Figure 8 shows the model repre-
sentation of the UL-PML scheme.
The typical design data have a hierarchical structure. This natu-
rally fits into the XML tree structure. Detailed geometry and to-
pology in a design can also be mapped to PML tree, which strictly
follows the syntax of XML. The compliance to industrial compu-
tation and communication standard is the premise of computa-
tional interoperability at the syntax level.
Nevertheless, there are open issues in applying XML to product
data representation. First, the mapping between existing CAD data
standards and the XML structure needs to be standardized 47
ISO TC184/SC4 committee is working on this issue. The XML
schema for product data needs to be properly defined according to
current needs as well as future extensions. Second, the XML syn-
tax is not as succinct as other CAD data formats. The size of XML
file is relatively large, and redundancy exists in tagged text. Third,
the flexibility of XML syntax makes standardization difficult. Is-
sues include child elements versus attributes, early-binding versus
late-binding 48.
4.3 Fine-Grained Control for Shared Data Set. In a distrib-
uted environment, cryptography is ideal for data set level access
control. A data set could be sent to multiple collaborators who
have different privileges to access the data subsets. It is also pos-
sible that a subset of the data set that the collaborator received
would be sent to a third party with supply chain relationships. The
access privilege is granted to each role through key distribution
and policy delegation. Policies determine who uses the keys and
when these keys come into effect. The number of keys a collabo-
rator owns is corresponding to the permission he or she has been
granted. The policy applied for first-tier collaborators can be del-
egated to other tier collaborators.
The key should be established before communication can be-
gin. The key distribution scheme should be secure against known
key attacks. If a particular session key is compromised, it should
not affect the usage of other session keys. As shown in Fig. 9, the
XML-based cross-domain information model becomes a bridge
between different data types used in various product development
areas. Different key sets may be distributed to users at different
security levels such that different sets of data are unlocked and
different views of data are provided.
The S-RBDDAC model needs two categories of mechanisms
for implementation. One is at the system administration level, and
the other is at the data set level. Each project owner defines and
implements the owner’s access control policy based on its inter-
ests. No centralized policy enforcement exists for data access con-
trol. At the system level, accesses to memory, disks, database, and
other data media need to be controlled. Privileges are defined in
security policies and policies are enforced through mechanisms of
locks, synchronization, and file read/write protections based on
access control matrices. Although perfect security is not possible,
we can achieve computational security if the cost of breaking the
cipher is more than the value of the information it is protecting
and the time required to break the encryption exceeds the useful
lifetime of the protected information.
5 Data Sharing Scenarios
At the initiation of a design project, the owner of the project
sets up administrative protocols such as role assignments and data
security levels based on contracts or other prior legal discussions.
Data ownership and information tracking also have to be deter-
mined and agreed upon. The S-RBDDAC model enables fine-
grained access control on design data through role assignments
and hierarchies of roles, data sets, policies, as well as schedules.
Recursive encryption with different keys guarantees minimal data
exposure. Partial data sharing through XML prevents reverse en-
gineering. All of these mechanisms provide different dimensions
of IP protection. This approach generally supports both geometric
and non-geometric design data sharing. Such interoperable inte-
gration is possible as a result of the XML common interface.
5.1 Selective Data Exchange. In selective data exchange,
Fig. 9 Selective information flow based on XML encryption with different key sets corresponding to various subsets of
data
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only necessary and relevant geometry, parameters, and constraints
are transmitted based on the PML model’s fairly loose structure.
In an engine design example shown in Fig. 10, two groups who
design clutch shoes and clutch nuts need to share some data to
make sure that the contacting surfaces of the two parts geometri-
cally match each other. PML links between surfaces in two com-
ponents can be built. The geometry and topology information of
the contacting faces in one can be fetched from the other to main-
tain consistency. In this linkage example, the clutch shoe Fig.
10a is at the server site. Once the sharable data in PML format
is published in a library Fig. 10b, it is available for the clutch
nut at the client site as reference Fig. 10c. Instead of transfer-
ring the whole data file, only relevant surfaces are transferred
through data sharing agents based on Common Object Request
Broker Architecture CORBA. If any change is made at the
server site Fig. 10d, the client can download the new geometry
through relevant PML links to maintain consistency Fig. 10e.
5.2 Geometric Data Sharing with Multiple Views. XML
encryption provides end-to-end security for structured data trans-
Fig. 10 Lean information exchange of engine design models in UL-PML scheme
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fer. Based on the XML encryption scheme, relevant information is
extracted from original types at the data owner’s site and trans-
formed into XML format. This XML data set then can be trans-
mitted to different client sites securely by encryption mechanisms.
Once the data arrive at a client site, it can be transformed into the
original or a different format and processed locally. The applica-
tion of the S-RBDDAC Model to PML restricts what portion of a
PML document a client can see and when such access is permit-
ted. Such restrictions are achieved through key management. En-
crypted PML provides nodal confidentiality for product design
data through the elimination of seemingly unnecessary nodes for
any given instance or session. The entire PML file can be en-
crypted. Alternatively, a portion of the PML tree may be en-
crypted, such as an element of the tree or only the contents of the
element.
Multiple views of the same data set can be achieved by encryp-
tion recursively with different keys. As shown in Fig. 11, the
design of an engine sub-assembly is distributed among three com-
panies, A, B, and C. While the engine case is designed at A, its
geometric interfaces with other components need to be shared
with B and C to ensure proper assembly relation. As the owner of
the engine case model, A defines security policy to share engine
Fig. 11 Selective geometry sharing in encrypted PML
Fig. 12 Different views of shared data provided for different roles
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case data. Engineers at A can select the specific shared interface
data sets based on technical requirements of assembly, transform
them into PML, and encrypt with different keys. According to the
policy, different sets of keys are distributed to B and C who design
exhaustion manifold and engine head, respectively. They have ac-
cess to the minimal data sets of the interfaces related to their
design, and different views of the same data can be provided for
them, as shown in Fig. 12.
5.3 Non-Geometric Engineering Data Sharing. As XML
format transformation becomes available for major commercial
software tools, other non-geometric engineering data can be
shared selectively in the same way using the XML-based lean
information sharing mechanism. For example, a set of experimen-
tal data for a design Fig. 13a originally in Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet can be easily converted into XML, and transmitted in
encrypted format Fig. 13b. Encrypted XML provides a generic
and secure data structure for heterogeneous models in collabora-
tive design. Data interoperability and openness enhance the over-
all information infrastructure of collaboration environment.
6 Discussion
The combination of the two mechanisms, partial data sharing
and fine-grained access control, provides a multi-level security
procedure for IP protection. Partial data sharing prevents reverse
engineering, while scheduled access control for data set allows the
protection of data segments. This lean information modeling and
sharing framework supports engineering data security manage-
ment at both the server and client sides in a peer-to-peer
environment.
Compared to the traditional data modeling and distribution
method, the lean approach may be a more effective alternative in
IP protection. The use of extended S-RBDDAC model access con-
trol and distributed XML data formats can reduce the overall risks
of IP infringement and improve system performance. There are
costs associated with this scheme. The S-RBDDAC model in-
creases the complexity of access control management at the server
side. The overhead of scheduling and key distribution is increased
in the fine-grained approach. Second, the size of XML could be
four to eight times larger than original ASCII files e.g., SAT, XT,
and STEP that contain the same amount of information. How-
ever, the lean data exchange approach will alleviate the problem
when partial data are transferred.
An experiment was conducted to measure and compare file
sizes resulting from the traditional methodology and the lean
method. Traditionally, the entire file has to be encrypted and sent
to each recipient. Besides the risk of exposing unnecessary data to
irrelevant parties, this also entails encrypting large files and send-
ing across the transmission channel. In contrast, the lean approach
provides customized data views for each recipient. The compari-
son of the data sizes is shown in Table 3.
Some other performance tradeoffs must also be considered. The
transformation of the original file into XML format and segmen-
tation of the data file into subsets are non-trivial. This will add
additional overhead to the performance of the model. However,
segmented subsets can be stored or cached and thus can be up-
dated and reused with associated model privileges.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a secure data modeling and distribution
framework to protect intellectual property in collaborative design
environments based on an S-RBDDAC model. This model ex-
tends the traditional RBAC model for fine-grained data access
control such that lean and secure data exchange and sharing are
supported. Based on the functional roles and schedules, relatively
stable and easy access control for collaborative environments can
be created. The uniqueness of this model includes the consider-
ation of time, scheduling, and value-adding activity with roles,
policy delegation relation in a distributed context, and fine-
grained access control at data set level. Heterogeneous data are
exchanged through XML common interface, which provides a
neutral format to enhance data interoperability. Partial data ex-
change is supported in this distributed data modeling scheme to
Fig. 13 Secure selective non-geometric engineering data exchange by XML encryption
Table 3 Size comparisons between the encrypted complete
model and the partial geometry in an experiment
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prevent reverse engineering. These factors increase the flexibility
of data sharing and promote a secure and interoperable informa-
tion infrastructure.
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